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Abstract 
We argue that online companies are able to 
exploit users’ varying levels of privacy needs. We 
show that by employing data analytics methods on a 
comparatively small amount of data it is possible to 
predict how high information privacy concerns of 
specific users are. We argue that online companies 
might be able to introduce “privacy discrimination”, 
in the sense that they might apply varying levels of 
privacy protection to users, based on their privacy 
concerns. Users indifferent about privacy could be 
presented with limited privacy options, adjusted terms 
and conditions or might be driven to disclose more 
personal information.  
1. Introduction  
One of the most vital streams of privacy research 
is the project of investigating peoples’ privacy 
concerns [1, 2]. Researchers in information systems 
research have put huge amounts of work into 
conceptualizing privacy concerns as a way to 
operationalize previous, more diffuse concepts of 
when people care about privacy [1]. They have 
measured antecedents of privacy concerns on a 
personal level [3] and in regards to the relation of the 
individual to a corporation [4], and they have 
contextualized the phenomenon [5] and compared it 
across cultures [6]. Numerous theories draw on or 
extend privacy concerns [5, 7-11]. There are attempts 
to reintegrate all of this research into coherent 
frameworks [2, 12]. Put bluntly, the rationale for 
investing time into investigating privacy concerns can 
be summarized like this: If we understand peoples’ 
privacy concerns, we can protect them from privacy 
threats where it is most needed. In particular the early 
literature on privacy concerns reflects this reasoning, 
justifying research on privacy concerns with privacy 
being “one of the most important ethical issues of the 
information age” [1, 13].  
However, just like anything that is measured and 
managed, information about privacy concerns can be 
misused: Research on privacy concerns has revealed 
information about when, where, how, vis-à-vis whom 
etc. people are concerned about privacy. All of this 
information could potentially be used to extrapolate 
peoples’ privacy concerns. This is especially troubling 
since there is a special emphasis in the research on the 
relation between privacy concerns and trust [14] and 
on individuals’ willingness to share information with 
companies [15]. When it is possible to infer privacy 
concerns, it is also possible to control trust and 
information sharing, at least to some extent. 
To capture this problem, we introduce the notion 
of privacy discrimination. It denotes the possibility 
that companies apply varying levels of privacy 
protection to different users. Most likely, this would 
happen on the basis of users’ privacy concerns. 
In order to explore the concept, we pose the 
following research questions: What exactly is privacy 
discrimination? Is privacy discrimination technically 
feasible? Is investing in privacy discrimination be 
sensible for companies? 
In the remainder of this paper we develop a 
definition of privacy discrimination based on the 
notion of price discrimination in economics and 
drawing on attempts to define privacy. We show that 
it is technically feasible to infer users’ privacy 
concerns from basic sociodemographic data about 
them. We discuss the implications of this technical 
possibility for individuals and online companies.  
2. Theoretical background 
2.1. Price discrimination 
According to Stigler (1987), price discrimination 
occurs when the ratio of the prices of two similar 
products is different from the ratio of their marginal 
costs (Stigler, 1987). Stigler’s seminal example is a 
book which is sold for $15 in the hardcover version 
but for $5 in paperback. This way, readers that are 
willing to pay $15 for a qualitatively superior book can 
do this, while readers that are only willing to pay less 
are not lost as customers. This example illustrates that 
prices can differ over time, but it is also possible for 
them to differ  in space , by using early-bird discounts 
[16] or by identifying specific individuals directly 
[17]. While Stigler’s definition is used widely, another 
prevailing definition is at least as relevant to this work. 
As Philips (1983, p. 5) puts it, “the usual answer: 
There is price discrimination when the same 





commodity is sold at different prices to different 
customers” [18]. Although not entirely convincing 
even to Philips himself because of its inferior 
distinctive quality (different prices and different 
customers?), this definition is better suited for this 
work. Since privacy efforts do not have a direct 
equivalent to Stigler’s marginal costs, it is more 
informative to apply Philips’ definition here.1 
 There are three types of price discrimination 
Pigou [19]: First-degree or “perfect” price 
discrimination occurs when sellers charge a different 
price for each unit of a good adjusted to the maximum 
willingness to pay for this unit. Second-degree price 
discrimination or “nonlinear” pricing, occurs when 
sellers charge different prices depending on the 
number of units of the good bought, but not differing 
across consumers (e.g. quantity discounts). Third-
degree price discrimination occurs when different 
purchasers are charged different prices, but each 
purchaser pays a constant amount for each unit of the 
good bought (e.g., student discounts). 
The effects of price discrimination on a company, 
market and country level are topics of ongoing interest 
to economists. From a social welfare perspective, price 
discrimination does not have to be negative, but can 
have upsides [20], for example by fostering research 
and development (R&D) efforts [21]. However, 
regulation of prices can also delay launches of new 
medication or even deter the launch in specific 
countries [22].  
Legally, the regulation of price discrimination 
differs across countries, but, as part of anti-trust 
regulations and other laws that secure healthy 
competition in markets, most legislations have at least 
some rules in place to regulate special forms of price 
discrimination or its application in specific areas . 
Many countries have rules against the “abuse of 
superior bargaining position”, particularly with 
respect to long-term business relationships but also in 
cases where firms do not hold superior market power 
[23]. In general, these laws are designed to prevent 
firms from acquiring too much political and economic 
power, thus securing small firms’ competitive 
possibilities.  
Despite such regulations, in practice, price 
discrimination is not the exception but ubiquitous. It 
has been observed in various industries, most 
prominently with airlines [24] in Europe [25] and the 
US [26], but also for medicine [27] or academic 
journals [28]. Recently, online businesses have 
demonstrated their special ability to take advantage of 
                                                 
1 One might argue that in the case of privacy, marginal costs are 
equal for all users since it takes the same amount of technical cost 
to realize privacy levels. However, this is countered by the 
price discrimination [17, 29, 30]. This seems to stem 
from their special expertise in Big Data, which has 
been shown to facilitate price discrimination [31]. 
2.2. Privacy and privacy concerns 
The scientific discussion surrounding privacy is 
exceptionally vital. Regarding the number and variety 
of disciplines dealing with it, the diversity of 
perspectives taken and research questions raised and 
the methods used to tackle these questions, privacy is 
a truly amazing topic. 
As a concept, defining privacy through concrete 
criteria has proven elusive and indeed undesirable 
[32], despite various attempts in the literature, see, 
e.g., [33, 34]. Based on this insight and on a more 
fuzzy understanding of privacy [35], Daniel Solove 
has proposed a taxonomy of privacy [36], organizing 
the activities where privacy issues can arise. Solove 
posits that privacy issues can arise as invasions in the 
form of intrusions and decision interferences towards 
individuals. Next, information collection in the form 
of surveillance or interrogations can harm individuals’ 
privacy. Data holders can be responsible for privacy-
sensitive information processing in the form of 
aggregation, identification, insecurity, secondary use, 
and exclusion. Finally, information dissemination in 
the form of confidentiality breaches, disclosure, 
exposure, increased accessibility, blackmailing, 
appropriation, and distortion can harm privacy. While 
the debate has certainly moved on since Solove 
published this taxonomy (2005) (cf. more recent 
reviews [13, 37]), these general pillars are still up to 
date. In information systems research, privacy 
concerns have become one of the major means to study 
privacy. Privacy concerns (often: Information Privacy 
Concerns, “IPC”) are “concern(s) that individuals 
have with the information privacy practices of 
organizations, which could compromise the 
individuals’ ability to control personal information” 
[1]. In the form currently used by most studies, IPC are 
able to measure individuals’ concerns about the 
collection of information, errors regarding 
information, secondary use of information, and 
improper access to information [1]. 
Research on IPC is usually conducted against the 
background of the more general Antecedent-Privacy 
Concern-Outcome (APCO) Model [13]. This model 
suggests that there is a set of factors determining IPC 
(see below). IPC in turn can affect a set of outcomes, 
e.g., self-disclosure of information, specific privacy 
opportunity costs of high levels of privacy, which tend to reduce 
revenues. 
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behaviours [38], marketing effectiveness [39], the use 
of privacy measures  [10] and settings [6] or the 
intention to use specific services [9]. Most studies 
follow this meta model either explicitly [referring to it 
by its name, e.g., 38] or implicitly [following the same 
modell without referring to directly, e.g., 39].  
Numerous antecedent factors influencing IPC as 
antecedents have been studied. Regarding individuals, 
factors affecting privacy concerns include personality 
traits [3, 5], individual motives [8], prior experience 
with privacy breaches [9], perceived self-efficacy 
[10], perceived vulnerability [10], privacy 
consumption (i.e. whether someone reads privacy 
information) [40], personal roles [41], perceived 
justice regarding information privacy [41], perceived 
control [42] and individual IT culture [43]. Emotions 
also influence privacy concern: “Joy significantly 
enhances privacy protection belief and reduces 
privacy risk belief. Interestingly, fear was found to 
significantly influence privacy risk belief, but did not 
influence privacy protection belief” [44]. Moreover, 
perceived relevance of information requested and user 
awareness of the privacy policy incorporating fair 
information practice principles significantly increase 
privacy protection belief and reduce privacy risk belief 
[44]. 
Regarding organizations, factors affecting 
privacy concerns include trust in the company [39], 
boundary management and permeability (i.e., the 
possibility to decide on what to share with whom) [8], 
registration efficiency [4], perceived security level 
[10] and privacy settings [40]. In the relevant 
literature, particular attention has been paid to trust. 
There are different theories about the relationship of 
trust and IPC [14]; these describe trust as an 
antecedent of IPC [45], parallel to IPC as another 
construct [15], or as an outcome of IPC [3]. Also, trust 
can be conceptualized regarding the internet [7] or a 
specific company [46]. 
In general, privacy concerns are also affected by 
context [5] as well as culture [6]. More precisely, there 
seem to be positive effects of collectivism, uncertainty 
avoidance, and prior privacy experience on IPC [6]. In 
the context of location-based social networks, privacy 
control and privacy policies reduce privacy concerns 
[47]. Individuals’ awareness of internet privacy 
legislation negatively influences privacy concerns, 
whereas previous privacy invasions do not [47]. 
Whether a location-based service is designed as push 
or pull has an impact on disclosure rates [48]. 
Regulation seems to lower perceived risks [48]. In e-
commerce contexts, familiarity with a vendor helps to 
mitigate perceived privacy risks [49].  
More specific theories making use of IPC are 
Privacy Calculus [7], Theory of Reasoned Action and 
Prospect Theory [5], Communication Privacy 
Management Theory [8],  Social Contract Theory [9],  
Social Cognitive Theory,  Protection Motivation 
Theory [10], and Social Exchange Theory [11]. 
2.3. Privacy discrimination 
The preceding section reveals three rationales 
which motivate research on privacy concerns. 
1. Privacy research investigates privacy concerns, 
because we want to protect people where they are 
concerned. In the APCO framework, this 
corresponds to investigating the relationships 
between Antecedents and Privacy Concerns. 
With better knowledge about antecedents, people 
can receive better protection. 
2. Privacy research investigates privacy concerns, 
because privacy concerns are a predictor of 
outcomes in the APCO framework, such as 
peoples’ willingness to share information, and 
we want to understand these outcomes. 
3. As a vital sub-field of 2, we want to know about 
privacy concerns to be able to better infer 
peoples’ privacy preferences. For example, 
according to the APCO framework, conversion 
rates and lower churn are important outcomes 
affected by individuals’ privacy concerns. 
While these accounts are justified, yet another 
view provides another perspective on the issue. In both 
of the strategies presented above, privacy concerns are 
only used as measurement. Information on privacy 
concerns is not perceived as constituting constructed 
facts that can change things in the world. Taking this 
view, it becomes clear that information on how 
privacy concerns work can be used in ways not 
intended by researchers investigating them. While 
there may be no intention to produce information that 
can be used for privacy discrimination in the way we 
describe it below in any of the strategies usually used 
to justify research on privacy concerns, their outputs 
still enable privacy discrimination.  
Based on the definition of price discrimination in 
Philips [18] mentioned above, we define privacy 
discrimination as all organizational or individual 
practices that apply differing privacy levels to 
different users. Given this definition, privacy 
discrimination does not necessarily have to arise from 
privacy concerns, but depends heavily on 
technological implementations. One can imagine a 
doctor passing a patient’s medical information to their 
partners based on an assessment of the privacy needs 
of the specific patient. Both in digital and in analogue 
form, privacy discrimination seems to be most likely 
when applied based on privacy concerns (cf. section 
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2.4, although using attributes such as age, gender, 
ethnicity etc. also are reasonable. Regarding Solove’s 
(2005) taxonomy of potential privacy issues, privacy 
discrimination is likely to happen as an invasion (see 
Example 2 in 2.4), as a decisional interference, during 
information collection (see Example 3 in 2.4), as 
additional interrogation, or during information 
processing, e.g., when particularly intrusive 
computations are offered to users with low privacy 
concerns. Consequently, users with low privacy 
concerns are prone to privacy dissemination as a result 
of privacy discrimination. 
Notice that privacy discrimination is not an 
instance of price discrimination but works in an 
analogous way. This analogy can be exploited to point 
out a few other similarities. Privacy discrimination 
seems to correspond to third-degree price 
discrimination, as different users have different 
privacy levels but the levels do not change over time. 
However, especially when customers have different 
concerns about different dimensions of privacy 
concerns (access, control etc. [1]), first-degree privacy 
discrimination becomes reasonable: Companies could 
change the privacy levels they apply from situation to 
situation. Furthermore, just like price discrimination, 
privacy discrimination should prima facie be 
considered value-neutral in order to enable a 
discussion about its advantages and disadvantages. 
Similarly, the economic implications of privacy 
discrimination are not obvious (see section 4, 
“Implications”). Privacy discrimination is able to 
exploit users’ willingness to share information just as 
price discrimination is able to exploit customers’ 
willingness to pay. Legally, regulation does not need 
to be specifically targeted at privacy discrimination 
but can still apply to it (just like anti-trust laws for 
price discrimination). For instance, several sections of 
the European General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR) might apply to privacy discrimination. 
Finally, because of their expertise in collecting and 
analyzing information, online companies are 
especially fit to apply privacy discrimination, in 
addition to price discrimination. 
There is a similar concept to privacy 
discrimination in the literature: Personalized privacy 
[50] differs from privacy discrimination in the respect 
that personalized privacy lets users set their privacy 
preferences. In cases of privacy discrimination, 
privacy preferences (concerns) are inferred and 
privacy levels are applied based on these inferences, 
without explicitly asking the user. Hence, privacy 
discrimination has a paternalistic aspect that 
personalized privacy does not share. Given the 
importance of autonomy in modern political thought, 
this difference is fundamental. 
2.4. Exploitation possibilities 
Companies have various means to make use of 
privacy discrimination. All practices that enable them 
to increase profits based on more information about 
customers and more information sharing from 
customers can potentially be leveraged through 
privacy discrimination. Therefore, instead of trying to 
provide an exhaustive list, we provide three 
representative examples of how privacy 
discrimination could be exploited by firms. An 
overview is provided in Figure 1. To ensure relevance, 
the examples have to fulfil three criteria: 
1. Adherence to the definition of privacy 
discrimination (cf. 2.3). 
2. Technical feasibility, at least according to the 
results in the next chapter. 
3. Financial plausibility with respect to existing 




Figure 1: Facsimiles of possibilities to exploit 
privacy discrimination 
Example 1: Companies could hide certain options 
or whole sections of settings from users. In cases 
where users with low (predicted) privacy concerns 
were given fewer options to choose or no settings at 
all (for example, by not showing the possibility to 
select recipients of photos at all) compared to users 
with high privacy concerns, companies would be 
treating different users differently in regards to 
privacy. This represents an instance of privacy 
discrimination (fulfilling criterion 1.). Such 
discrimination is also technically implementable 
(criterion 2.): Based on the results from section 3., 
“Predicting Privacy Concerns”, companies could 
direct users with predicted low privacy concerns 
between 1 and 2 to options like the ones depicted in 
the right column of Figure 1. Users with intermediate 
or high PCs (between 3 and 5) could be directed 
options like the ones depicted in the left column. 
Example 2: Companies could preset privacy-
related options for users. Consumers are especially 
susceptible to fall for biases [51] and nudges [52] 
when they are not highly concerned about a situation 
or want to move quickly, particularly in digital 
Page 4978
contexts [53]. In cases where users with low 
(predicted) privacy concerns are given default choices 
with lower privacy levels than users with high privacy 
concerns, companies would be treating different users 
differently with respect to privacy (criterion 1.). This 
is also technically implementable (criterion 2.).  
Example 3: Companies could ask users about 
more or less personal information at initial registration 
and potentially during use. In cases where users with 
low (predicted) privacy concerns were asked for more 
information (or more intrusive information, see, e.g., 
[54]) than users with high privacy concerns, 
companies would be treating different users 
differently with respect to privacy (criterion 1.). This 
is also technically implementable (criterion 2.).  
3. Case study: Predicting IPC 
In this section, we make the case for the technical 
feasibility of privacy discrimination. The purpose of 
this is to demonstrate that it is possible to predict 
peoples’ privacy concerns with reasonable accuracy. 
In order to do this, we used experimental data to train 
a random forest classification model to predict 
participants’ privacy concerns. 
3.1. Materials & Methods 
The dataset we used contained the answers of 
n=385 participants from a student sample collected for 
an experiment on privacy concerns. The dataset 
contained (amongst other variables that we do not use 
for this study) the age and gender of the participants as 
well as measures of their willingness to share 
information with a messenger service company and 
their privacy concerns about that company. 
Participants’ willingness to disclose information 
was collected using the items provided by Norberg, et 
al. [55]. We included the items that asked for the 
participants’ willingness to disclose information on 
their personal pictures (disclosure1), cell phone 
number (2), location data (3), vacation time (4), 
address (5), and name (6). We chose these items 
because they are commonly shared to companies and 
websites such as social networks and are therefore 
relevant to our study. Online companies often have 
this kind of information and therefore can use it to 
infer users’ privacy concerns. As there is some 
correlation between the behavioral intention to 
disclose information and actual information sharing 
(see section, 2.2.), these constructs serve as 
                                                 
2 This led to minor differences between the results displayed in 
Table 2 and those displayed in the following tables. For example, 
in Table 4, we display decrease in Adj. R2 for some features. These 
approximate measures for participants information 
sharing. Participants’ IPC were collected using the 
constructs provided by Hong & Thong [12] [13] . 
We used a random forest model to predict 
participants’ privacy concerns. “A random forest is a 
classifier consisting of a collection of tree-structured 
classifiers […] where the [classifiers] are independent 
identically distributed random vectors and each tree 
casts a unit vote for the most popular class at input” 
[56]. We had 500 decision trees with 2 features tested 
per node. Varying the number of trees and variables at 
the nodes did not result in any significant differences 
in performance. 
Random forests have several advantages over 
predictions based on regressions or other machine 
learning methods. Our main reasons for choosing a 
random forest for this application were the speed in 
learning [57] and classification [58], the possibility of 
determining the importance of variables used in 
classification [57], the ease of interpreting both results 
and the prediction process, and the fact that they are 
nonparametric and do not require specific scales or a 
unimodal distribution of the variables [57, 58]. Even 
more important for this specific case: In practice, 
decision trees are the second most important algorithm 
for data scientists (after regressions) and random 
forests the sixth most important, with the more 
important ones being either not applicable to our 
problem (cluster analysis, time series) or meta-
algorithms, learning approaches etc. (ensemble 
methods). This ensures the practical relevance and 
applicability of our research. 
3.2. Results 
In reporting the results of the random forest in 
more detail, we follow the so-called A3 method. The 
A3 method as designed to report the results of various 
machine learning methods (adaptability) accurately 
and accessible, for practitioners as well as for 
researchers unfamiliar with machine learning [59]. 
Using the A3 package [60] we performed additional 
analysis2 on the same data, in order to present more 
detailed information on the distribution of predictive 
qualities and the importance of the features in the 
models.   
In Table 2, we provide the confusion matrix of the 
last round of cross validation. Table 3 suggests that 
most instances are classified correctly. Of those that 
are not, most are classified as a neighboring class. 
However, the model performs poorly for instances 
were not robust when exploring differing feature combinations (by 
exclusion of features) in cross-validation. These changes do not 
change any conclusions, qualitatively.  
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with IPC=1. This is probably due to the fact that there 
are only 29 (7.5%) such individuals in the data set. 
This is in line with the literature. Most of these 
instances are predicted as IPC=2. For an application of 
the method in practice this degree of accuracy is 
sufficient, and indeed favorable (see section 4, 
“Implications”): Instead of risking applying too low 
privacy protection to individuals that in fact are not 
concerned about privacy (i.e., have IPC=1), these 
individuals would have some basic privacy protection 
(according to IPC=2). This is precautionary. 
Table 1: Confusion matrix 
  1 2 3 4 5 
Class 
error 
1 2 18 2 1 1 0.916 
2 9 48 16 7 4 0.429 
3 1 25 28 3 6 0.555 
4 1 8 9 51 28 0.474 
5 0 1 1 24 42 0.382 
Based on these results, we conclude that it is 
possible to predict peoples’ privacy concerns solely by 
using their age, gender and willingness to disclose 
information3. Overfitting generally is not a problem in 
random forest models [56]. Still, in order to prevent 
random/statistical noise biasing otherwise-robust 
results, we used 5-fold cross-validation to assess our 
model. Table 3 reports the cross-validation. Column 2 
displays the root mean square error (RMSE) of the 
prediction; column 3: mean error (ME); column 4: 
median error. Columns 5 and 6 display what 
percentage of the predicted instances are in a range of 
+/-.5, and 1, respectively, to users’ true privacy 
concerns. Column 7 displays the out-of-bag error 
(OOB) of the model. Column 8 displays the R2 for a 
random forest regression model, computed on the 
same data as the classification model we use 
throughout the study. This measure is only included as 
a service to readers not familiar with the OOB, which 
is better suited to evaluate classificatory models. As all 
error measures (RMSE, ME, Median Error) do not 
vary strongly between validation rounds, we conclude 
that our random forest predicts privacy concerns 
sufficiently well. 
                                                 
3 Notice that this conclusion concerns only the possibility of the 
prediction of privacy concerns. We do not intend to make any 
statement about causality between personal information and 
Table 2: Performance results of the random 
forest classification 
 
4. Implications of privacy discrimination 
A larger sample size and more precise dataset 
would improve the confidence of our conclusion that 
privacy discrimination is feasible. In fact, we expect 
that a (considerably) higher prediction accuracy is 
achievable for online companies, given the following 
four factors: 
1. Online platforms have better data science 
expertise than we have.  
2. Online platforms have more data than we have. 
3. Online platforms have higher computing 
capacities than we have.  
4. Online platforms have the (kind of) data we have 
and more data, regarding online behavior, socio-
demographic variables etc.  
In conclusion, online businesses are able to 
predict people’s privacy concerns with at least the 
accuracy and detail of this study. 
4.1. Users’ perspective 
We draw on Osterwalder and Pigneur [61]’s 
characterization of customer relationships in e-
businesses to discuss the implications of privacy 
discrimination on users. Based on their extensive 
research on business models, strategy, and processes, 
online companies need to balance the “feel and serve” 
with “trust and loyalty” in their customer relationship, 
and should use information strategies to determine the 
right balance. 
Regarding the “feel and serve” dimension of 
customer relationship, privacy discrimination can be 
beneficial. Products that deploy privacy 
discrimination might present a more fluid customer 
experience. When users do not have to deliberately set 
options or think about with whom to share what 
information, they are spared time and stress. In 
privacy concerns, nor about which information is best to predict 
privacy concerns. 
Round of cross 
validation (k) RMSE ME 
Median 
Error 
In +/- .5 
range 




1 0.89 0.584 0 0.519 0.896 0.481 0.583 
2 0.94 0.597 0 0.532 0.883 0.497 0.581 
3 0.875 0.558 0 0.545 0.896 0.494 0.585 
4 0.83 0.532 0 0.545 0.922 0.5 0.583 
5 0.94 0.597 0 0.532 0.883 0.51 0.586 
Mean 0.895 0.5736 0 0.5346 0.896 0.4964 0.5836 
 
Page 4980
particular users with low levels of privacy concern 
might value the convenience of not being bothered 
with choices they do not care about. They might 
appreciate the possibility to be able to provide 
additional information that could increase product 
performance and improve their experience. Users with 
high privacy concerns might value feeling protected 
from the beginning of their relationship with a 
company without having to find settings to calibrate 
restrictively. On the other hand, when users try to find 
hidden settings or wonder why systems act the way 
they do (and the company did not communicate this as 
an instance of privacy discrimination) they might 
experience stress while trying to find and change 
settings. This would worsen the customer experience.  
Regarding the “trust and loyalty” dimension, a 
similar picture emerges. Users might gain trust in a 
company when they see that settings are initialized 
according to their preferences potentially contributing 
to long-term customer loyalty. On the other hand, pre-
set privacy settings that are not restrictive enough 
might cause customers to lose trust. Hence, from a user 
perspective, a cautious model for predicting privacy 
concerns seems favourable. This is reflected in the 
results, where users with minimal privacy concerns 
(=1) were classified as having privacy concerns =2. 
Generally, skepticism about privacy 
discrimination is possible on three levels. First, users 
might disagree with specific decisions made based on 
privacy discrimination. When companies fail to pre-
set options appropriately, users might be dissatisfied. 
Second, users might perceive privacy discrimination 
to be itself a privacy issue: Personal data are used to 
make sensitive inferences which might disseminate 
(Solove, 2005). Third, users might consider privacy 
discrimination to be a case of paternalism, which 
people tend to dislike, and be skeptical about it on 
these grounds. This analysis implies four possible 
views on privacy discrimination. Similar to privacy 
concerns, there might be privacy discrimination 
concerns. We discuss four idealized user types based 
on a matrix of these views (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2: Matrix of possible attitudes towards 
privacy and towards privacy discrimination 
User archetype (UA) 1: These users are not 
concerned about privacy and not concerned about 
privacy discrimination. They value the time savings 
offered by privacy discrimination. 
User archetype 2: These users are concerned 
about privacy, but not concerned about privacy 
discrimination. They value the time savings of privacy 
discrimination, because they perceive it to protect their 
privacy concerns without interfering with their usage 
of the product. 
User archetype 3: These users are not concerned 
about privacy but are concerned about privacy 
discrimination. They dislike privacy discrimination 
because they perceive it to be an invasion of privacy 
or they do not like having decisions made for them 
(paternalistically). 
User archetype 4: These users are concerned 
about privacy and concerned about privacy 
discrimination. They are skeptical about sharing 
information in general, and they want to take care of 
their privacy themselves. 
We hypothesize that UA1 and UA4 are especially 
common (i.e., privacy concerns and privacy 
discrimination concerns correlate). However, all four 
attitudes are plausible (as is a spectrum of intermediate 
attitudes). 
4.2. Companies’ perspective 
Deploying privacy discrimination is most likely 
the decision of a company. To the best of our 
knowledge, there are no publicly known cases of 
actions based on privacy discrimination. We consider 
three possible explanations for this. First, companies 
might not yet have developed the means to engage in 
privacy discrimination. This seems unlikely, given the 
relative ease of determining our results (section 3). 
Second, cases of privacy discrimination might exist 
but not be publicly known. This is possible and would 
be concerning to advocates of privacy transparency. 
Third, companies might have deliberately chosen to 
not apply privacy discrimination. We center our 
discussion of companies’ perspective on privacy 
discrimination on the question of why companies 
might so far have chosen not to deploy privacy 
discrimination.  
While analyzing specific business processes is too 
fine-grained and analyzing business strategy too case-
specific, analyses of the business models and 
stakeholders of online companies should reveal why 
we do not know of any cases of privacy discrimination. 
Different authors studying online business models 
propose different taxonomies and classifications. 
However, all agree on the importance of information 
for online businesses. It is especially important for 
marketing but also valuable in operations and other 
functions [62]. 
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Abstracting from the peculiarities of specific 
business models proposed in these classifications, we 
work with a generalized, simplified model of online 
businesses (Fig. 3). We include the relevant 
stakeholders on the right because they are not strictly 
part of the business model (because they do not have 
value exchanges with the company) but they are 
important for the discussion. In this model, users give 
(or disclose) information to companies in order to 
receive information. Customers pay money for 
information. In some cases, users and customers are 
identical, while in others, like Facebook the user is not 
a customer. The user discloses personal information in 
order to see information about others and about 
companies, organization, and other groups. Customers 
can make use of the users’ personal information to 
target advertising. For content providers or 
intermediaries (e.g. Netflix or eBay) the user is also a 
customer. Users give personal information and 
information about their needs and receive either 
information-as-a-product (content providers) or 
information-as-a-service, to facilitate physical 
exchanges (intermediary). In any case, information 
about customers is important to companies’ success as 
is summarized by the notion of information as the 
“lifeblood of e-business”. We indicate these relations 
with the grey block arrows in Fig. 3. 
 
Figure 3: A generic model of online 
companies’ business models, stakeholders 
and the importance of information4. 
By applying privacy discrimination, online 
companies are able to improve the way in which they 
capture the specific willingness of different customers 
to disclose information (analogous to the situation of 
price discrimination). Hence, online companies can 
collect more information (Example 3, section 2.4) and 
information marked by better quality (e.g., by 
replacing inferred ZIP codes with users’ self-reported 
ZIP codes). The consequence of higher information 
quality or quantity can be better (product) information, 
for both users and customers. For example, in the case 
of Netflix, customers and users could receive 
recommendations that better fit their interests, 
                                                 
4 The grey block arrows indicate a causal impact, e.g., when users 
give more (or better) personal information to an online company, 
increasing their satisfaction and activating better 
word-of-mouth effects. On the other hand, in the case 
of Facebook, users might receive news that fits their 
interests better and customers might receive more 
information, enabling them to improve the way in 
which they target their customers, in turn.  
Examples 1 and 2 also show how product 
information might be improved for users. When users 
have less restrictive sharing settings, there is more 
potential information for other users to receive, 
potentially increasing the overall experience. This can 
lead to higher user numbers and less churn. 
Consequently, when (product) information for 
customers improves, revenues per customer increases 
and the number of customers also increases. All these 
measures increase the online company’s revenue. 
Detrimental effects are possible as well. However, 
some cases where privacy discrimination is sensible 
from a financial perspective should exist. Turning 
towards other stakeholders of online companies 
explains the lack of publicly known cases of privacy 
discrimination. Privacy is an extremely sensible topic, 
and even more so in the public discussion. Facebook’s 
Cambridge Analytica Scandal has shown that privacy 
invasions can seriously harm a company’s image. 
Historical cases of popular outrage against companies 
[63] and research on corporate social responsibility 
[64] suggest that such cases can have serious financial 
consequences, both in compensation fees and in lost 
revenues because of image losses. These risks might 
keep managers from investing in privacy 
discrimination. Employees and suppliers perceive 
risks to the company as risks to themselves. Job losses 
or losses of important customers because of a suddenly 
worsened public image pose existential problems for 
both these groups. Employees could also see their own 
privacy at stake, when their company engages in 
practices that heavily exploit their users’ privacy. 
Thus, while from a managerial point of view, privacy 
discrimination might offer potential increases in 
conversions and revenue, worries about employees 
and suppliers are likely to be in the way of applications 
of privacy discrimination. The authors of this work 
lack the expertise to assess the legal status of privacy 
discrimination. Online companies’ managers might 
face the same situation. Both doubts about the legality 
and definitive knowledge about the illegality could 
explain missing evidence of privacy discrimination. In 
conclusion, we find that what has prevented the 
application of privacy discrimination so far are either 
legal hurdles or public concerns rather than a lack of 
technical feasibility. 
the product information that the company can give to customers is 
becoming more (or better). 
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5. Conclusion 
All cases of practices where organizations or 
individuals apply differing privacy levels to different 
users are instances of privacy discrimination. This 
definition is open to varying concepts of privacy, but 
points to specific practices in collecting and 
processing information. We show that it is technically 
possible to infer peoples’ privacy concerns with 
sufficient accuracy to base privacy discrimination on 
the results. While privacy concerns may not be the 
only basis for privacy discrimination, this is at least 
one case where privacy discrimination does work. 
There are minimal technical obstacles to 
implementing privacy discrimination. 
Having argued that users can have varying 
attitudes towards privacy discrimination, we find that 
implementing privacy discrimination may be a 
sensible decision for some companies. This could lead 
to more and better data collection, which in turn could 
lead to better products, more customers, and higher 
revenues. However, public and legal hurdles may 
stand in the way of privacy discrimination, amplified 
by the concerns of employees and business partners. 
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